By Assistant Professor Erica J. Hashimoto

Editor’s note: This is an excerpt of an article
that will be published in Volume 85, Issue 2 of the
North Carolina Law Review in January 2007.

Assistant Professor Erica J. Hashimoto

hirty years ago, the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized that criminal
defendants have a constitutional
right to represent themselves.
Since that time, both academics
and the popular media have been fascinated
by, and almost uniformly critical of, the
decisions of pro se defendants to represent
themselves.
Dr. Jack Kevorkian, Colin Ferguson,
Congressman James Traficant, John
Muhammad and, most recently, Zacarias
Moussaoui all tried their hands at self-representation with seemingly disastrous (and
highly publicized) consequences.
Colin Ferguson, for example, who was
convicted of opening fire on the Long Island
Railroad and murdering several people, represented himself throughout his trial and was
sentenced to 200 years in prison. During his
opening statement, he rambled incoherently
about a vast conspiracy against him, asserting

to the jury that the only reason there were
93 counts in the indictment was because the
year was 1993.
The media circuses surrounding these
cases, combined with the ludicrous courtroom behavior of at least some of the defendants, has led to a perception that defendants
who represent themselves are foolish at best
and mentally ill at worst.
Are these well-publicized pro se defendants representative of all pro se defendants?
Or to put it another way, are pro se defendants necessarily either crazy or foolish? The
answer is that we simply cannot know for
sure without looking at empirical data.
In the past five years, the importance
of this empirical question has taken on
increased significance because the Supreme
Court, troubled by the possibility that pro se
defendants are ill-served by the decision to
represent themselves, has called into question the wisdom of continuing to recognize a
constitutional right to self-representation.
After conducting an empirical study of
pro se felony defendants, I conclude that
these defendants are not necessarily either
ill-served by the decision to represent themselves or mentally ill. Instead, the data suggest that these defendants have legitimate
- and constitutionally important - reasons for
representing themselves.
The primary argument against the right
to self-representation is based on fairness to
the defendant. On this view, the right to selfrepresentation undermines the defendant’s
due process right to a fair trial by giving him
a constitutional right to do something that
ultimately can only hurt him.
As the Supreme Court bluntly stated the
point, “[o]ur experience has taught us that a
pro se defense is usually a bad defense, particularly compared to a defense provided by
an experienced criminal defense attorney.”

The assessment that pro se representation
in felony cases necessarily is a bad idea, however, is contradicted by the empirical data I
collected. Although pro se defendants make
different choices on the path to resolving
their cases, they are not necessarily ill-served
by those decisions.

Outcomes in state court
In state court, pro se defendants charged
with felonies fared at least as well as, and
arguably significantly better than, their represented counterparts.1
A total of 238 defendants in the sample
of state court felony defendants (less than
0.5 percent of the total defendants in the
database for whom the type of counsel was
reported) were pro se at the time their cases
were terminated, and outcomes were provided for 234 of them.
As set forth in Table 1, of the 234 pro se
defendants for whom an outcome was provided, just under 50 percent of them were
convicted of any charge (either at trial or
by guilty plea). And of the 50 percent who
were convicted of something, just over 50
percent (or 26 percent of the total number of
pro se defendants for whom an outcome was
reported) were convicted of felonies.
For represented state court defendants, by
contrast, a total of 75 percent were convicted
of some charge (either at trial or by guilty
plea), and of those convicted, 85 percent
were convicted of felonies.
Thus, only 26 percent of the pro se defendants ended up with felony convictions,
while 63 percent of their represented counterparts were convicted of felonies.
Notably, although pro se defendants in
the database were significantly more likely
to go to trial than represented defendants,
their acquittal rate on all charges at trial
(5/23 or 22 percent) equaled that of the

Table 1: Outcomes for Defendants in State Court

Guilty
Plea to
Felony

Guilty Plea
to
Misdemeanor

Trial:
Acquitted
on All
Charges

Trial:
Convicted of
Misdemeanor

Trial:
Convicted
of Felony

Dismissals/
Deferred
Adjudications

Pro Se
Defendants

22%

20%

2%

3%

4%

48%

Represented
Defendants

60%

11%

1%

--

4%

24%

(52/234)

(27,868/46,699)

(46/234)

(5,202/46,699)

(5/234)

(542/46,699)

(8/234)

(192/46,699)

(10/234)

(1,767/46,699)

(113/234)

(11,128/46,699)

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
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Table 2: Method of Disposition in Federal Court Database

Plea of
Guilty

Jury
Trial

Bench
Trial

Dismissals

Statistical
Dismissals

1998

Pro se: 75%
Represented: 88%

Pro se: 12%
Represented: 5%

Pro se: 0.5%
Represented: 0.4%

Pro se: 10%
Represented: 6%

Pro se: 2%
Represented: 0.4%

1999

Pro se: 71%
Represented: 89%

Pro se: 9%
Represented: 5%

Pro se: 0%
Represented: 0.3%

Pro se: 15%
Represented: 6%

Pro se: 4%
Represented: 0.4%

2000

Pro se: 86%
Represented: 90%

Pro se: 7%
Represented: 4%

Pro se: 0%
Represented: 0.3%

Pro se: 7%
Represented: 5%

Pro se: 0%
Represented: 0.3%

2001

Pro se: 79%
Represented: 90%

Pro se: 8%
Represented: 4%

Pro se: 0%
Represented: 0.3%

Pro se: 11%
Represented: 5%

Pro se: 2%
Represented: 0.3%

2002

Pro se: 79%
Represented: 91%

Pro se: 11%
Represented: 3%

Pro se: 0%
Represented: 0.3%

Pro se: 10%
Represented: 5%

Pro se: 0%
Represented: 0.3%

Note: Percentages may not add to 100 percent due to rounding.

represented defendants (542/2,501 or 22
percent), and their 57 percent (13/23) partial
success rate, defined as acquittal on all felony
charges, substantially exceeded the 29 percent (734/2,501) partial success rate of the
represented defendants.

Outcomes in federal court
Pro se felony defendants in federal court,
like their state court counterparts, were much
more likely to go to trial than represented
defendants.2 As set forth in Table 2, the pro se
defendants went to trial (usually jury trial) at
approximately double the rate at which represented federal felony defendants went to trial.
In terms of acquittal rates at trial, over
the five-year period from 1998 to 2002, 65
unrepresented defendants in the database
went to jury trial, and five of them were
acquitted, yielding a trial acquittal rate of
7.69 percent (5/65). Over that same fiveyear period, 7,744 defendants identified as
being represented by counsel went to trial,
with 1,238 acquitted, for a trial acquittal
rate of 15.99 percent (1,238/7,744). The
acquittal rate for represented defendants
therefore was over twice as high as that for
unrepresented defendants.
Measured a different way, however, pro se
federal felony defendants were just as likely
to be acquitted as their represented counterparts.
Because the jury trial rate of unrepresented
defendants was so much higher than that of
represented defendants and because so many
represented defendants are convicted by way
of guilty plea, if the pro se acquittal rate is
Spring/Summer 2006

expressed as a percentage of the total number
of pro se federal felony defendants, rather than
as a percentage of pro se defendants going to
trial, the acquittal rate for pro se defendants
is virtually identical to the acquittal rate for
represented defendants: five pro se felony
defendants were acquitted out of a total of
664 unrepresented felony defendants, for a
0.75 percent overall acquittal rate.
By way of comparison, 1,495 represented
felony defendants were acquitted either at
bench or jury trials out of 190,647 total
represented felony defendants, yielding a
0.78 percent overall acquittal rate. Thus,
when viewed in the aggregate, pro se federal
felony defendants do not seem to be faring
significantly worse than their represented
counterparts.
Therefore, in both state and federal
court, the empirical evidence undermines
the assumption that pro se defendants necessarily are ill-served by the decision to selfrepresent.

Signs of mental illness in pro
se defendants
Those criticizing the right to self-representation also assert that the overwhelming majority of defendants who choose to
represent themselves are mentally ill and
that the right to self-representation therefore
represents only the recognition of delusional
beliefs rather than informed and rational
choices of the pro se defendants.
The data refute that assertion. In fact,
the vast majority of pro se defendants do not
appear to exhibit any overt signs of mental

illness. Because a defendant cannot constitutionally be required to stand trial unless he
is mentally competent, in virtually every case
in which a defendant manifests any sign of
mental illness, a federal district court judge
will order a competency evaluation.
As set forth in Chart 1 (see next page),
of the over 200 pro se felony defendants in
federal court that I studied, evaluations to
determine competency to stand trial were
requested or ordered in only about 22 percent of the cases.3 Moreover, not only did
less than 22 percent of the pro se defendants receive competency evaluations but,
as depicted, in well over half of the cases
(26/45) in which the defendant was ordered
to undergo an evaluation, the evaluation was
ordered after the defendant invoked his right
to self-representation.
Because of the long-held assumption that
those who represent themselves are mentally
ill, a defendant’s decision to represent himself
pro se even absent other indications of mental
illness, may well give rise to a concern on the
part of the court that the defendant is mentally ill. A trial court judge therefore is much
more likely to order a competency evaluation when a defendant invokes his right to
self-representation, even absent any other
indicia of mental illness, than she would
be for a defendant who does not choose to
proceed pro se.
Counting only those defendants who had
competency evaluations prior to the invocation of the right to self-representation, only
19/208 pro se defendants (9 percent) were
ordered to undergo evaluations. While this
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figure may be higher than the rate of competency evaluations for defendants in the federal
system generally, it certainly undermines the
notion that most defendants who represent
themselves exhibit signs of mental illness.

Why self-represent?
Why do felony pro se criminal defendants
choose to represent themselves if not because
of mental illness? The evidence suggests
that in many cases, the choice may result
from concerns about or dissatisfaction with
appointed counsel.
Most significantly, nearly half of the pro
se federal felony defendants in the database
I created asked the court to appoint new
counsel prior to invoking the right to selfrepresentation.
This dissatisfaction appears to come from
two sources. First, the data suggest that some
pro se defendants are concerned about the
quality of court-appointed counsel.
Pro se defendants in the database I created
were more likely to have court-appointed
counsel than federal felony defendants as a
whole.
There is a substantial body of evidence
demonstrating that states are struggling to
provide even marginally adequate courtappointed counsel for indigent defendants.
Because those defendants have no right
to counsel of their choice, self-representation is their only real alternative if they are
unhappy with the counsel whom the judge
has appointed.
Pro se defendants also went to trial at significantly higher rates than their represented
counterparts.
Because deficiencies in the quality of
counsel are more apparent in the lead-up

to trial than during the course of plea negotiations (particularly since negotiating a plea
requires less consultation with a client than
preparing for trial), and because the stakes
for the defendant at trial arguably are higher
than the stakes in plea negotiations, it follows
that overworked or substandard counsel will
be of greater concern to defendants going to
trial than to those taking pleas.
The trial rate of pro se defendants therefore inferentially supports the theory that
concerns about the quality of counsel may
drive some felony defendants to represent
themselves.
The data suggest one other source of dissatisfaction with counsel - defendants’ ideological considerations. As set forth in Table
3, pro se defendants in the database I created
were 13 times more likely to be charged with
tax offenses as their most serious charge than
federal felony defendants overall.
Tax evasion often lends itself to an ideological defense - in particular the assertion
that the federal government lacks the authority to require its citizens to pay taxes.
Many such defendants may well believe
that government-appointed counsel cannot
adequately present that defense and thus
may choose to represent themselves.

Suggested improvements
To the extent that indigent defendants
represent themselves either as a result of legitimate concerns about the quality of courtappointed counsel or because of ideological
considerations, the right to self-representation protects the defendant’s personal right
to defend in the way the defendant believes
most advantageous.
That having been said, the data also dem-

Chart 1: Competency Evaluations of Pro Se Felony
Defendants in Federal Court

9%

■ No Competency Screen

13%

■ Competency Screen After
Pro Se Request

78%

■ Competency Screen

Before Pro Se Request
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onstrate that recognizing a right to self-representation creates opportunities for abuse
by the state, and several modifications to
the existing legal structure are therefore
needed to protect the constitutional rights
of defendants.
First, jurisdictions need to ensure that
the waiver of counsel in fact is knowing and
voluntary.
Particularly in jurisdictions where the
sheer number of indigent defendants has
overwhelmed the system, the court has
an incentive to encourage or even compel
defendants to represent themselves. But to
the extent that defendants do not knowingly
and voluntarily waive the right to counsel,
their constitutional rights are violated.
The data strongly suggest that such involuntary or unknowing waivers may be occurring in misdemeanor cases, and some form
of protection therefore needs to be adopted
in order to ensure that all such waivers are
both knowing and voluntary.
Second, because at least some of the
defendants who choose to represent themselves do exhibit signs of mental illness, trial
judges need mechanisms to ensure that those
defendants are knowingly and voluntarily
relinquishing the right to counsel.
The extent to which a trial judge can take
account of the defendant’s mental illness in
making the constitutional determination is
somewhat unclear because of the Supreme
Court’s most recent pronouncement in this
area. Legislative action therefore may be
needed in order to make clear that judges can
and should consider the presence of mental
illness in determining whether the defendant
has knowingly and voluntarily waived the
right to counsel.
Finally, although there now is little
information on the extent to which courts
appoint standby or advisory counsel, such
appointments can play a vital role in protecting the fair trial rights of pro se defendants.
Standards therefore should be adopted to
ensure that courts appoint standby counsel
as a matter of course.
These three refinements to the existing structure will ensure that the right to
self-representation does not infringe other
constitutional rights.

Conclusion
The data establish that the right to selfrepresentation furthers the Constitution’s
basic guarantee of fairness.
The select few felony defendants who
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choose self-representation do not appear
to suffer significant adverse outcomes from
that decision, and the right therefore does
not appear to infringe the defendants’ due
process fair trial rights.
Of perhaps even more significance, it
appears that defendants choose to represent
themselves not because they suffer from
mental illness but instead because they are
dissatisfied with counsel.
On the mental illness point, the data
are clear. While it is likely that at least some
defendants choose to represent themselves
because of mental illness, the vast majority of
pro se defendants exhibit no signs of mental
illness.
To the extent that there are issues of mental illness, those should be addressed through
the waiver of counsel standard.

The fact that some mentally ill defendants
choose to represent themselves should not be
the basis for questioning the legitimacy of a
right that protects all defendants.
The right to self-representation in practice protects the interest of defendants in presenting their cases as effectively as possible.
Indeed, for indigent defendants who have
been appointed unskilled or inept counsel

and for defendants seeking to assert ideological defenses, the right to self-representation
stands as the bulwark protecting the defendant from an unfair trial.
In short, the data expose the fallacy of the
prevailing view of pro se felony defendants
and demonstrate that the right to self-representation in fact serves a vital role in protecting the rights of criminal defendants. ■

End notes

1 Data on state court defendants come from the National Archive of Criminal Justice Data, State Court Processing
Statistics, 1990-2000: Felony Defendants in Large Urban Counties. A complete description of the database and the
methodology for collection of the data is available at http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/NACJD.
2 The federal court data come from the Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center, Defendants in Federal Criminal Cases
Terminated in U.S. District Court, http://fjsrc.urban.org/index.cfm (follow “Download” hyperlink; submit name
and e-mail address; then follow “Standard Analysis Files” hyperlink).
3 These figures come from a database I compiled comprised of information from the publicly available docket sheets of
208 pro se felony defendants in federal court.

Table 3: Pro Se Defendants’ Most Serious Lead Charge in Federal Court

Pro Se
Cases*

Represented Felony
Defendants FY 2002**

Assaults

2.3% (4/177)

0.5%

Drug Offenses

15.8% (28/177)

41.7%

1.7% (3/177)

0.7%

31.6% (56/177)

17.5%

Other Property Offenses

1.1% (2/177)

3.5%

Immigration Offenses

6.2% (11/177)

17.1%

Public Order - Racketeering & Extortion

8.5% (15/177)

1.3%

Public Order - Non-Violent Sex Offenses

1.7% (3/177)

0.8%

Public Order - Failure to Appear

0.6% (1/177)

--

Public Order - Perjury, Contempt & Intimidation

1.7% (3/177)

0.5%

Public Order - Tax Offenses

9.0% (16/177)

0.7%

Public Order - Other Non-Regulatory

1.1% (2/177)

0.4%

Public Order - Other Regulatory

1.1% (2/177)

0.8%

Threats on the President

1.1% (2/177)

0.04%

Robbery

4.5% (8/177)

2.3%

Weapons

11.3% (20/177)

9.3%

Escape
Fraudulent Property Offenses


* Twelve
of the cases included in the federal docketing database included more than one pro se defendant (the number of pro se co-defendants in those cases ranged from two to 10). In order to prevent multiple co-defendants in the
same case from skewing the data on the type of case, for the purposes of Table 3, each entry represents only one case, rather than counting each defendant separately. Therefore, there are only 177 entries included in this table.

** The
data in this column reflect the most serious lead charges for defendants in criminal cases terminated in fiscal year 2002. See Compendium of Federal Justice Statistics, 2002 at 58. I eliminated some categories of charges
because none of the pro se cases involved those charges, and the percentages therefore do not total 100 percent.
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